

POLICY AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS

Overview for 2002

The U.S. campaign against global terrorism in 2002 highlighted the importance of our international drug control programs. As the single greatest source of illegal revenue, the drug trade has long been the mainstay of violent political insurgencies, rogue regimes, international criminal organizations, and terrorists of every stripe. Whether through the heroin that financed the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan or the cocaine that sustains the decades-old insurgency in Colombia, the drug trade generates the money that is the lifeblood of the violence that increasingly threatens global peace and stability.

In 2002, despite a host of obstacles and setbacks, ranging from the hazards of operating in a dangerous war zone to the vicissitudes of domestic politics in drug source and transit countries, we made progress in critical areas. Working with our allies, our programs helped key governments weaken the drug trade at critical points. This included attacking crops on the ground, destroying processing facilities, interdicting drug and precursor chemical shipments, and breaking up trafficking organizations. We provided our partners with essential training assistance to strengthen their law enforcement and judicial systems and improve their extradition procedures, while working with them to reduce drug consumption in their own countries. At the same time, closer international cooperation among governments and financial institutions is systematically closing the loopholes that have let the drug trade legitimize its enormous profits through sophisticated money laundering schemes. The establishment of the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) has strengthened counternarcotics cooperation within the hemisphere. The MEM is a peer review system managed by the Inter American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS/CICAD) to assess national and hemispheric performance and to identify ways in which that performance can be improved.

The Drug Threat to the U.S.

Cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and synthetic amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), in that order, are the illicit drugs that most concern the United States. All the cocaine and heroin, as well as the bulk of the ATS drugs, originate outside the United States. Therefore, cutting off their flow to the United States remains our principal international counternarcotics goal. Though U.S. consumption has declined, cocaine still poses the greatest drug threat. Each year an estimated 300 metric tons or more enter the country, feeding addiction, fueling crime, and harming the economic and social well being of the United States. Since nearly all cocaine originates in the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, we targeted the bulk of our resources toward the Andean region.

Under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, our central focus in 2002 was again Colombia, the world's leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a significant supplier of heroin to the United States. Nearly 80 percent of the world's cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) is processed in Colombia, the majority from indigenous Colombian coca crops, plus a limited amount from Peruvian and Bolivian cocaine base. Although Colombia grows less than two percent of the world's opium poppy, virtually all of its heroin production is destined for the United States market.

Cocaine and heroin revenues fuel terrorism and the decades-old civil war in Colombia. All the insurgent and paramilitary groups depend upon them. They fund the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the hemisphere's largest and oldest terrorist group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the paramilitary United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The AUC and the FARC control areas that have the densest levels of coca and poppy cultivation in the country.

Since these drug crops are the "green gold" that keeps the civil war alive, the Colombian government is engaged in a long-term commitment to reduce and ultimately eliminate both coca and poppies. In 2002, Colombian counternarcotics forces carried out record levels of aerial eradication operations. As a result, coca cultivation fell to 144,450 hectares, a 15 percent drop from 2001. This was the first time in a decade

that Colombia has seen a significant drop in its coca crop. At year's end, Colombian forces had sprayed nearly 123,000 hectares of coca, a 45 percent increase over 2001, itself a record year. If all this coca leaf had been harvested and converted to cocaine it could have yielded approximately 500 metric tons of cocaine base or HCl. With each ton of HCl worth \$100 million (\$100/gram) at U.S. street retail prices, this activity theoretically kept as much as \$50 billion worth of cocaine from entering world markets.

Colombian aircraft also sprayed over 3,000 hectares of opium poppy, a 67 percent increase over the previous year's total. This was nearly half the 6,500 hectares of opium poppy detected at the end of 2001. Such spraying totals are especially impressive, given that most of these operations take place in dangerous zones in which minimally armored crop dusters must regularly take hits from rebel ground fire.

Despite aggressive eradication programs in 2002, coca cultivation rose modestly in Bolivia, and Peru. Year-end data on Colombia were not available at the time of publication. The Bolivian crop is believed to have jumped nearly 23 percent to 24,400 hectares of coca, notwithstanding eradication of approximately 12,000 hectares, a near-record annual eradication total. In Peru, there was an estimated eight percent rise to 36,600 hectares, although the government achieved its eradication goal of 7,000 hectares. These numbers remain relatively small compared to those of 1994, when Peru led the world with 108,000 hectares of coca and Bolivia had over 48,000. Nonetheless, any upward shift in cultivation trends is always a warning signal to all governments concerned.

Colombia faced several significant impediments to its counternarcotics efforts. In Colombia, the replant rate may range as high as 6,000 to 9,000 hectares per month. The GOC was eradicating at a higher rate than the replant rate in the latter part of the year, and the 2003 eradication is expected to continue at a rate in excess of the replanting rate. However, a sustained aggressive pace of spraying will be needed to break the replanting cycle. In Colombia, the drug trade has a clear advantage since the bulk of its coca and opium grows in zones that fall beyond the firm security control of the central government. Constant hits from insurgent ground fire frequently hinder eradication operations. All the insurgent factions have a life-or-death stake in the survival and expansion of the crops. Drug revenues finance the civil war. Without this income, the insurgents could buy neither arms nor influence and would become vulnerable. With their survival dependant on coca and opium, we can expect the insurgent groups to use all their firepower and ingenuity to protect and expand existing crops.

In Bolivia and Peru, political, economic and cultural battles have become obstacles to coca control. In both countries, radical movements have seized upon the historical tradition of coca cultivation as a rallying cry for indigenous rights against the dominant urban political culture. In Bolivia, by equating coca eradication with an attack upon both the poor in general and the indigenous rural poor in particular, a burgeoning anti-establishment political front has coalesced around the *cocaleros* (coca growers) movement. Since the organization's leader finished second in the June 2002 presidential elections, the government cannot ignore the *cocaleros*. The existence of this movement will complicate—and probably raise the costs of—coca eradication plans.

In Peru, a coca growers' movement modeled on Bolivia's *cocalero* organization staged a number of large protests during 2002. In response, the government of Peru signed agreements to halt coca eradication temporarily in certain regions, as well as to include *cocalero* representatives in the discussions of revisions to Peru's counternarcotics law.

The Peruvian government has not approved eradication in areas such as the Apurimac and Monzon valleys, two key sources of coca leaf. To compound the Peruvian government's problems, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso—SL) organization, which was forcibly disbanded in 1992, has reappeared on the scene. Before its suppression, this violent Maoist movement, which was financed by cocaine, engaged in a brutal guerrilla campaign that killed an estimated 30,000 people in the 1980s and early 1990s. The incipient resurgence of one of the world's most brutal terrorist movements, which is once again linked to coca cultivation, poses new challenges for the Peruvian government and worries for the region.

A further factor in the resurgence of coca cultivation in Peru has been the increase in price for coca leaf and base. This was due to the increased pressure on cultivation in Colombia and the alternative routes to moving the product from Peru once an effective Air Bridge Denial program had been put in effect in the mid-1990s. During the five years that joint U.S.-Colombian and U.S.-Peruvian operations limited narcotics traffickers' ability to use air routes to transport Peruvian cocaine base to Colombia for refining, Peru's coca cultivation fell precipitously. The disruption of this "air bridge" made most Peruvian coca unmarketable and caused an abandonment of coca fields and an exodus of coca farmers from the major coca growing areas. Peru, until then the largest coca producing country, plunged dramatically and has been replaced by Colombia as the largest coca growing country. In the aftermath of the program's suspension, the drug trade in Peru has been slowly increasing. Coca cultivation has risen to the 24,000 hectares detected in 2002 as Peruvian drug traffickers have expanded their operations towards Brazil, Bolivia and maritime shipments of the Peruvian coast.

Heroin

Although Colombia and Mexico account for less than five percent of the world's estimated opium production, most of the heroin detected in the United States originates in those two countries. Since eliminating poppy cultivation can have a very significant impact on the flow of U.S.-bound heroin, we support opium poppy eradication programs in both countries, as well as increased law enforcement initiatives, such as the installation of x-ray machines at all international airports.

As insurance against an aggressive eradication program, Colombian drug traffickers have been planting opium in neighboring countries. Narcotics traffickers supply farmers in neighboring countries with seeds, technical assistance, and cash loans. For example, a steady rise in opium latex seizures by the Peruvian National Police in 2002 confirmed the expansion of poppy cultivation and opium trafficking in Peru.

In Mexico, U.S. experts estimate that an area totaling 13,500 hectares of opium poppy was under cultivation during 2002 (a decrease from 14,600 in 2001). Given the favorable climate and terrain, two to three harvests per year were possible in the primary growing regions. Mexican government personnel eradicated 19,600 hectares in 2002 (up from 17,000 in 2001). The remaining area, some 2,700 hectares (down from 4,400 in 2001) produced an estimated 47 metric tons of opium gum (which could have produced 5.6 metric tons of pure heroin—or 11 metric tons of black tar heroin). This figure is down substantially from 71 metric tons of opium gum (or 8.5 metric tons of pure, or 16 metric tons of black tar, heroin) in 2001.

In 2002, Afghanistan once again became the largest source of illicit opium. Following the removal of the Taliban regime, Afghan farmers in the country's traditional growing areas replanted the crops that had been briefly eliminated by the draconian measures of the Taliban authorities. Afghan farmers have since turned to poppy cultivation as a risk-avoidance response to a continuing drought (poppy is hardy), lack of credit or farm inputs for licit agricultural products, not to mention the vast difference in income among any licit choice and opium. At the end of 2002, USG surveys detected 30,750 hectares of poppy, with a potential opium yield of 1,278 metric tons.

With Afghanistan's re-emergence as the world's largest producer of illicit opium, Burma fell to second place in 2002. A joint USG/government of Burma survey found that the maximum potential yield for opium in Burma in 2002 totaled only 630 metric tons, down 235 metric tons (or approximately 26 percent) from 2001. The area under cultivation dropped to 78,000 hectares, down from 105,000 hectares in 2001. Over the past six years, opium production in Burma is estimated to have declined by more than 75 percent, from an estimated 2,560 metric tons in 1996 to only 630 metric tons in 2002.

Synthetic Drugs

The greatest threat over the next few years may not come from cocaine and heroin, but from man-made equivalents. Demand for synthetic ATS, which include methamphetamine and MDMA ("ecstasy"), has

shot up both in the industrialized nations and in most countries of the developing world. Methamphetamine now competes with cocaine as the stimulant of choice in many parts of the globe, including the United States. In Southeast Asia, methamphetamine vies with heroin as the principal illegal drug for consumption and export. In Burma, the heart of heroin production, methamphetamine has become a major source of income for the drug trade. The relative ease of manufacturing synthetics from readily available chemicals appeals as much to small drug entrepreneurs as to the large international syndicates. It eliminates reliance on vulnerable crops, such as coca or opium poppy and is not dependent on climate or growing season. Synthetics allow individual trafficking organizations to control the whole process, from manufacture to sale on the street. They generate large profits and can be manufactured anywhere. There are centers of methamphetamine production in a wide-range of countries, including Burma, China, North Korea, Mexico, and Poland.

Methamphetamine is one of the fastest-growing drug threats in the United States today. Well-established drug trafficking organizations, based in Mexico and California, control a large percentage of the U.S. methamphetamine trade. While Mexico is still the principal foreign supplier of methamphetamine and ATS precursors for the United States, Operation “Mountain Express III”—unveiled by DEA, U.S. Customs and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in January 2002—demonstrated that traffickers had begun to use Canada as a diversion point for substantial quantities of pseudoephedrine used in domestic methamphetamine production.

Ecstasy, an amphetamine analogue, is now a very popular drug in the United States. It is the nickname for 3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA. Ecstasy’s rise was closely linked to the 1990’s “rave” dance culture that swept up Europe’s younger generation. Ecstasy’s stimulant properties provided a chemical boost allowing participants to dance for hours at all-night dance parties (“raves”). Ecstasy now has its own international cult following, evident from the numerous Internet sites that give detailed information on everything from how to make and use MDMA “safely” to discussions of possible dangers and medical consequences. Much of the MDMA available on the international drug market—and most of that seized in the United States—is manufactured in clandestine laboratories in the Netherlands. The government of the Netherlands has undertaken an intensive campaign to break up the ecstasy industry. That Dutch criminals are shifting some manufacturing operations to nearby Belgium suggests the campaign is bearing fruit. Wholesale distribution of the drug is dominated by Israeli criminal organizations operating in Europe and to some extent in the United States.

As seizure data in various INCSR chapters indicate, throughout the world ecstasy has become the drug of choice for young people in their late teens and early twenties. In 2002, authorities in countries as distant and distinct as Costa Rica, Iceland, and South Africa reported marked increases in ecstasy consumption and seizures. Ecstasy’s most pernicious quality, however, is that many of its young users view it as a performance enhancer instead of as a dangerous drug. Its proponents bill it as a non-addictive stimulant without lasting side effects. When an addictive drug develops a reputation for being relatively benign, efforts to suppress it become correspondingly difficult.

In the case of ecstasy this is especially disturbing. Brain imaging research in humans indicates that MDMA/ecstasy causes injury to the brain, affecting neurons that use the chemical serotonin to communicate with other neurons. The serotonin system plays a direct role in regulating mood, aggression, sexual activity, sleep, and sensitivity to pain. Many of the risks users face from MDMA/ecstasy are similar to those found with the use of cocaine and amphetamines. More alarmingly, however, research by the USG’s National Institute for Drug Abuse (<http://www.nida.nih.gov/Infofax/ecstasy.html>) has linked MDMA/ecstasy use to possible long-term damage to those parts of the brain critical to thought and memory. One primate study showed that exposure to MDMA for four days caused brain damage that was evident six to seven years later.

Marijuana

Marijuana production and consumption is a serious problem in many countries—including in the United States. More than 10,000 metric tons (MT) of domestic marijuana and more than 5,000 metric tons of marijuana is cultivated and harvested in Mexico and Canada and marketed to more than 20 million users in the United States. Smaller quantities of marijuana are also produced in Colombia, Jamaica, Paraguay and other countries. The high-potency indoor grown marijuana, which is produced on a large-scale in Canada (and has also been found within the United States), is a particular concern. In many cases, this marijuana is grown in laboratory conditions—with specialized timers, ventilation, moveable lights on tracks, nutrients sprayed on exposed roots and special fertilizer—all designed to maximize the THC levels in the marijuana. The resulting drug is particularly powerful, dangerous and addictive. Although in the past some have suggested that marijuana was harmless, the latest scientific information indicates that marijuana produces withdrawal symptoms and is associated with learning and memory disturbances.

Attacking the Trafficking Organizations

In 2002, governments in key source and transit countries struck at important drug syndicates by targeting their key figures and operatives. For example: in Colombia, drug enforcement authorities working with their U.S. counterparts conducted a joint operation against the Garcia-Giraldo organization, a heroin trafficking enterprise that shipped an estimated quarter of a ton of heroin annually to New York and Philadelphia. They arrested 30 criminals, including Garcia himself, and are believed to have dismantled the organization.

In Mexico, law enforcement agencies and military personnel significantly reduced the capabilities of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) cartel by arresting Benjamin Arellano Felix, along with the AFO's chief of operations and logistics. They also arrested 43 allegedly corrupt police officers who had provided protection to the AFO. The AFO was further disrupted by the death of Ramon Arellano Felix in a shoot out. The Mexican military also arrested Jesus Albino Quintero Meraz, a top lieutenant in the powerful Gulf Cartel.

Such arrests of high-level traffickers and government officials in their pay demonstrate—to the criminals and to the governments fighting them alike—that over time even the strongest syndicates are highly vulnerable to coordinated and sustained international pressure. They also demonstrate the commitment of our partners to root out the drug-related crime and corruption that threatens their own national security.

Strengthening Institutions

We have long-term programs with many governments to strengthen critical institutions, such as judicial and banking systems, to eliminate opportunities for penetration and manipulation by the drug trade. Judicial systems are particularly vulnerable, since in many countries the fate of a major drug criminal depends on the decision of a single judge. In some countries, judges receive low salaries and enjoy little or no protection from criminal retaliation. Not surprisingly, law enforcement agencies in source and transit countries have successfully jailed prominent traffickers, only to see them released after a seemingly indefensible or inexplicable decision by a single judge.

Thanks to U.S. assistance, that dynamic is gradually changing. In 2002, several countries continued to modify their laws and professionalize their court systems. These include reforms ranging from installing more modern equipment to changing the way judges are appointed and improving the security protection they can expect in the event of threats. Though there are still instances of judges arbitrarily dismissing evidence against or releasing well-known drug traffickers, the number of such cases is declining, thanks to courageous action on the part of individual judges and the governments that are improving their efficiency and safety.

Extradition

Extradition to stand trial in the United States is one of the most effective tools to help other governments break up trafficking organizations. The long sentences imposed in the United States on notorious drug criminals are vivid reminders of what can happen to even the most powerful drug cartel leaders when they can no longer manipulate their environment through bribes and intimidation. Extradition, especially of nationals, has always been a very sensitive issue in a number of countries concerned over the perception that extraditing their citizens to the United States might be viewed as a derogation of national sovereignty. Willingness to extradite has therefore been a key indicator of political will and mutual trust. Although several countries still prohibit the extradition of their nationals, we believe that extradition of nationals can be made acceptable to most governments, as long as treaty provisions are reciprocal and balanced.

We saw excellent cooperation in extradition matters in 2002, especially in the Western Hemisphere where it is a sensitive but critical issue. Colombia was among those countries that cooperated most on extradition matters. Colombia extradited over 40 fugitives to the United States in 2002, nearly twice the number for 2001. Thirty-seven of these were Colombian nationals (including one person who was a dual U.S.-Colombian national). While in 2002, Mexico extradited to the United States 17 fugitives facing drug charges (including the major drug trafficker, Jorge Mario Rios Laverde), Mexico's October 2001 Supreme Court decision that held that Mexico cannot extradite fugitives who face possible sentences of life imprisonment has made it much more difficult to extradite fugitives from Mexico, and has actually discouraged certain states from seeking to extradite the fugitives at all.

Precursor Chemicals

Cocaine, heroin and synthetic drugs must be manufactured. This process requires chemicals, many of which are subject to governmental control. Cocaine and heroin refining operations generally require widely available "essential chemicals." Substitutes for unavailable chemicals can be used for most of the chemicals used in the manufacturing process, but there are some key chemicals—potassium permanganate for cocaine and acetic anhydride for heroin—for which there are few easily obtainable substitutes. Synthetic drug manufacture requires even more specific "precursor chemicals," such as ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine. These chemicals, used mainly for pharmaceutical purposes, have important but fewer legitimate uses. They are commercially traded in smaller quantities to discrete users. The United States, other major chemical trading countries, and the UN's International Narcotics Control Board worked in 2002 to improve an informal, multilateral system for exchanging information with respect to these chemicals. The goal was to improve controls on the key cocaine and heroin chemicals, and those necessary for synthetic drugs. Countries must have efficient legal and regulatory regimes to control chemicals, without placing undue burdens on legitimate commerce.

Controlling Supply

Our mission is to reduce and ultimately cut off the flow of illegal drugs to the United States. To do so, we attack drug supply at critical points along a five-point grower-to-user chain linking the consumer in the United States to the grower in a source country. In the case of cocaine or heroin, the chain begins with the growers cultivating coca or opium poppies, for instance, in the Andes or Burma. It ends with the cocaine or heroin user in a U.S. town or city. In between, lie the processing (drug refining), transit (shipping), and wholesale distribution links.

Our international counternarcotics programs target the first three links of the grower-to-user chain: cultivation, processing, and transit. The closer to the source we can attack, the greater the likelihood of halting the flow of drugs altogether. Crop control is by far the most cost-effective means of cutting supply. If crops are destroyed or left unharvested, no drugs enter the system. We are in effect removing a malignant growth before it can metastasize into the system. In a Utopian world, with no drug crops to

harvest, no cocaine or heroin could enter the distribution chain; nor would there be any need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations.

Real world conditions are more complicated. Destroying a lucrative crop, even an illegal one, carries enormous political, economic and social ramifications for the producing country. It inevitably means attacking the livelihood of a large—and often the poorest—sector of the population. Democratic governments that take away vital income without any quid pro quo seldom survive for long. Implementing lasting crop control programs takes time, as governments must develop viable alternatives for the affected population. Therefore, we also focus upon the other links: the processing and distribution stages of laboratory destruction and interdiction of drug shipments.

Though it is the most efficient way of eliminating a drug crop, massive eradication is neither legally nor politically feasible in many countries. Our programs must have the flexibility to shift resources to those links where we can achieve both an immediate impact and long-term results. As our experience over the past few years in Peru and Bolivia has demonstrated, the right combination of effective law enforcement actions and alternative development programs can also deliver truly remarkable results. We work closely with the governments of the coca growing countries to find the best way to eliminate illegal coca within the context of each country's unique situation.

Coca Reduction

Large-scale coca cultivation takes place in only three countries—Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Modern technology allows us to locate the growing areas precisely and attack them—a much less difficult task than trying to stop drugs once they are in the transportation pipeline. It is easier to eradicate a stationary target such as a coca field than to seek out and destroy the equivalent amount of finished cocaine distributed among trucks, boats, and aircraft. Eliminating coca on the ground is also highly cost-effective. USG studies conducted in the early 1990s indicate that in Bolivia and Peru, where the alkaloid content of the coca leaf is high, every 200 to 250 hectares of coca taken out of production deprives the drug trade, on average, of roughly one metric ton of refined cocaine. Even manual eradication can make a difference. By this measure, the estimated 12,000 hectares eradicated manually in Bolivia, combined with the estimated 7,000 hectares eliminated in Peru, kept the equivalent of between approximately 76 and 95 metric tons of cocaine from entering the system.

High-speed agricultural spray aircraft, however, are many times more efficient than other forms of eradication. If those planes that have been spraying Colombian coca fields had unobstructed access to all the principal coca plantations, they could destroy a large percentage of the coca crop in a matter of months, using environmentally safe herbicides. With the shift of the bulk of coca cultivation into the rebel-controlled zones in Colombia, our aircraft have faced a more difficult situation. Though dense concentrations of coca cultivation in a geographically confined area give the planes a better target, the planes are also exposed to a level of hostile gunfire for which they were not designed.

Illegal Drugs, Spraying, and the Environment

Inevitably, questions arise over the environmental risks of regular spraying of illegal drug crops. Colombia is at this time the only country that allows aerial spraying of coca and opium poppy. The Colombian government has authorized the herbicide that is being used to conduct aerial eradication in the growing areas. The only active ingredient in the herbicide used in the aerial eradication program is glyphosate, one of the most widely used agricultural herbicides in the world. It has been tested widely in the United States, Colombia, and elsewhere in the world. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved glyphosate for general use in 1974 and re-registered it in September 1993. EPA has approved its use on food croplands, forests, residential areas, and around aquatic areas. It is one of the top five pesticides, including herbicides, used in the United States.

Environmental Consequences of Illicit Coca Cultivation

In the past two decades, coca cultivation in the Andean region has led to the destruction of approximately six million acres of rainforest. Working in remote areas beyond settled populations, coca growers routinely slash and burn virgin forestland to make way for their illegal crops. As tropical rains erode the thin topsoil of the fields, growers must regularly abandon their parcels to prepare new plots—increasing soil erosion and runoff, depleting soil nutrients, and, by destroying timber and other resources that would otherwise be available for more sustainable uses, decreasing biological diversity. Traffickers also destroy jungle forests to build clandestine landing strips and laboratories for processing raw coca and poppy into cocaine and heroin.

Many of these illicit coca growers are negligent in their use of fertilizers and pesticides. Seeking to maximize their incomes and being largely ignorant about the consequences of indiscriminate use of strong chemicals, coca growers dump large quantities of highly toxic herbicides and fertilizers on their crops. These chemicals include paraquat and endosulfan, both of which qualify under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's highest classification for toxicity (Category I) and are legally restricted for sale within Colombia and the United States.

Finally, toxic chemicals are used at each stage of cocaine production. USG studies conducted in the early 1990s in Bolivia and Peru indicated that one kilogram of cocaine base required the use of three liters of concentrated sulfuric acid, 10 kilos of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of potassium permanganate, and one liter of concentrated ammonia. These toxic pesticides, fertilizers, and processing chemicals are then dumped into the nearest waterway or on the ground. They saturate the soil and contaminate waterways, poisoning water systems and dependent species in the process.

Political Will

The most powerful weapon in fighting the drug trade is an intangible: political will. The best-trained counternarcotics force, equipped with state-of-the-art police and military hardware, cannot succeed without the full commitment of the country's political leadership. When political leaders have had the courage to sacrifice short-term economic and political considerations in favor of the long-term national interest, we have seen the drug trade weaken. Conversely, when they have succumbed to the lure of ready cash, the drug syndicates have prospered accordingly.

The drug trade flourishes when it can establish an economic modus vivendi with a weak or complacent government. In exchange for the short-term benefits of large infusions of drug money into the economy (or into personal secret accounts or political treasuries), corrupt government officials can limit counternarcotics operations to those sectors least likely to harm a given set of trafficking interests. If drug cultivation needs protecting, a government can focus on interdiction rather than eradication. Government forces can also eradicate some crops while drug syndicates exploit corrupt enforcement and timid judicial systems to stay in business. Government officials may also launch anti-trafficking campaigns, but in offshore financial centers promote bank secrecy and lax incorporation laws that facilitate money laundering. In every case, the price of these short-term gains is the long-term entrenchment of drug interests. Therefore, a basic objective of U.S. counternarcotics policy is to prevent drug interests from becoming entrenched by strengthening the political will in the key source and transit countries. When political will wavers, corruption creeps in, subverts the rule of law, and puts democratic government in jeopardy.

Fighting Corruption

The fight against the drug trade is part of a broader struggle against corruption. Drug organizations possess a very powerful instrument for corruption: money, vast quantities of it, generated by drug trafficking. There is currently no widely available, easily renewable commodity more lucrative than illegal drugs. In most cases, they are relatively cheap to produce and offer enormous profit margins that allow

the drug trade to generate criminal revenues on a scale without historical precedent. For example, assuming an average U.S. retail street price of one hundred dollars a gram, a metric ton of pure cocaine is worth a \$100 million on the streets of the United States; twice as much if the drug is cut with additives. By this measure, the 100 or so metric tons of cocaine that the USG typically seizes each year could theoretically be worth as much as \$10 billion to the drug trade—more than the gross domestic product of some countries. Similarly, the estimated 123 metric tons of cocaine products seized by Colombia in 2002 would have a theoretical U.S. street value of over \$12 billion. Even if only a portion of these profits flows back to the drug syndicates, we are nonetheless speaking of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars.

To put the scale of these sums into perspective, in FY 2002 the State Department's budget for international drug control operations was approximately \$892 million. That equates to roughly nine metric tons of cocaine; the drug syndicates have lost that amount in a single shipment without any indication that they felt the loss.

Money—the Power to Corrupt

Wealth on this scale gives large trafficking organizations a practically unlimited capacity to corrupt, particularly in countries where government and law enforcement officials are poorly paid. For Colombia, where anti-democratic insurgents control and feed upon income from the drug trade, the threat is obvious. But even in economically weak countries without revolutionary movements, the drug trade's wealth makes it as great a threat to democratic government as an armed insurgency. Guerrilla armies or terrorist organizations overtly seek to topple governments by force; drug syndicates, like termites, prefer to destroy them surreptitiously from within. When a country's interior or defense minister, attorney general, or even president, is on its payroll, the drug trade can count on a secure operating environment. Once this form of corruption has become deeply entrenched, it is difficult to eliminate without damaging many of the healthy institutions of an already weak democracy.

The ultimate worry of democratic leaders in countries where the drug trade is strong should be that one day traffickers might take de facto control of a country by putting a majority of elected officials, including the president, on its payroll. Although such a scenario has yet to play out, there have been enough close calls to suggest that it could happen, were it not for the sort of collective effort we are undertaking with our partners.

Next Steps

Battling the international drug trade is a complex, dynamic process. Contrary to expectations, it does not get easier with time. Every time we score a major success—and over the past decade we have scored many—the drug trade learns from it. As successful counternarcotics operations eliminate the less agile drug syndicates, those that survive get smarter and more sophisticated, adopting ingenious new strategies for concealment and survival. We have seen this already with the emergence of hundreds of small, less targetable syndicates that filled the void left by the destruction of Colombia's Medellin and Cali cartels. This type of forced natural selection eventually leaves us with a very astute adversary.

The drug trade itself also evolves naturally over time. We are now confronting second-generation multinational drug syndicates that have adopted modern management techniques, use state-of-the-art communications, and have sophisticated technical and financial expertise. As we have noted, they also have nearly unlimited financial resources to draw upon. The international counternarcotics effort, therefore, will require even greater tactical adaptability and flexibility, closer coordination between governments across the whole spectrum of diplomacy and law enforcement, and significant resources.

Yet, for all its sophistication as a criminal organization, the drug trade is still a business, an extremely prosperous and dangerous business. As a criminal organization it can hide safely in the shadows; but to prosper as a business, it must emerge into the daylight of the legitimate world. There it becomes

vulnerable. It needs raw materials, processing chemicals, transportation networks, and, most important of all, a means of getting its profits into legitimate commercial and financial channels. A business that cannot reinvest its profits soon goes bankrupt. Since governments ultimately control the global financial system, they can also render it almost impossible for drug and other criminal revenues to enter the system. But it only takes one or two entry points, such as storefront banks in small isolated countries, for dirty money to enter legitimate commerce. If we want to bankrupt the most lucrative criminal enterprise in history, we will have to seal those portals. That must be our goal for the years ahead.

Demand Reduction

Our demand reduction strategy encompasses a wide range of initiatives. These include efforts to prevent the onset of use, intervention at “critical decision points” in the lives of vulnerable populations to prevent both first use and further use, and effective treatment programs for the addicted. Other aspects encompass education and media campaigns to increase public awareness of the harmful effects of drugs. This latter effort involves the development of coalitions of private/public social institutions, the faith community, and law enforcement entities to mobilize national and international opinion against the drug trade and to encourage governments to develop and implement strong counternarcotics policies and programs. The demand reduction program also provides for evaluations of the effectiveness of these efforts and for “best practice” research studies to use these findings to improve similar service provided in the U.S.

In 2002, INL funded bilateral training at various locations throughout the world on topics such as community/grassroots coalition building and networking, science-based drug prevention programming, and treatment within the criminal justice system. INL also continued to sponsor sub-regional demand reduction academies in Medellin, Colombia and Sao Paulo, Brazil, and co-funded with Lions Club International the establishment of a new academy in the Czech Republic. It co-sponsored the 4th Global Drug Prevention Network (GDPN) summit in Penang, Malaysia. The purpose of the summit was to develop an enhanced communications system for coordinating the participation of 7,000 drug prevention organizations from over 70 countries.

INL continued to fund comprehensive, multi-year scientific studies on pilot projects and programs. The demand reduction program also provides for evaluations of the effectiveness of these efforts and for research studies to use these findings to improve similar services provided in the U.S. The Spring/Summer 2002 issue of the *Journal of Social Work Research and Evaluation*, a professional publication that address international social research programs, published a 12-page article on INL-funded training. Research continues on prevention programs in selected countries that have developed promising prevention and anti-violence modalities from INL-funded training.

Methodology for Estimating Illegal Drug Production

How Much Do We Know? The INCSR contains a variety of illicit narcotics-related data. These numbers represent the United States Government’s best effort to sketch the dimensions of the international drug problem at this time. The numbers range from cultivation figures, relatively hard data derived by proven means, to crop production and drug yield estimates, data that become softer as more variables come into play. As in previous years, we publish these data with an important caveat: the yield figures are potential, not final numbers. Although they are useful for determining trends, even the best are ultimately approximations.

Each year, as we get better data through field research, we revise our estimates. This type of field research is far from easy. The clandestine, violent nature of the illegal drug trade makes it difficult to develop precise information. At the same time, the harsh terrain on which many drugs are cultivated is not always easily accessible. This is particularly relevant given the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information over diverse and treacherous terrain.

What We Know With Reasonable Certainty. The most reliable information we have on illicit drugs is how many hectares are under cultivation during any given year. For a decade and a half, the United States Government has estimated the extent of illicit cultivation in a dozen nations using proven statistical methods similar to those used to estimate the size of licit crops at home and abroad. We can therefore estimate the area under cultivation with reasonable accuracy.

What We Know With Less Certainty. The picture is less clear where crop yields are concerned. How much of a finished product a given area will produce is difficult to estimate. Small changes in factors such as soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place. Moreover, most illicit drug crop areas are not easily accessible to the United States Government, making scientific information difficult to obtain. Therefore, we are estimating potential crop available for harvest. Not all of these estimates allow for losses, which could represent up to a third or more of a crop in some areas for some harvests. The value in estimating the size of the potential crop is to provide a consistent basis for a comparative analysis from year to year.

Harvest Estimates. We have gradually improved our yield estimates. Our confidence in coca leaf yield estimates, as well as in the finished product, has risen in the past few years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America. In all cases, however, multiplying average yields times available hectares indicates only the potential, not the actual final drug crop available for harvest.

While farmers naturally have strong incentives to maximize their harvests of what is almost always their most profitable cash crop, the harvest depends upon the efficiency of farming practices and the wastage caused by poor practices or difficult weather conditions during and after harvest. Up to a third or more of a crop may be lost in some areas during harvests.

In addition, mature coca (two to six years old) is more productive than immature or aging coca. Variations such as these can dramatically affect potential yield and production. Additional information and analysis is allowing us to make adjustments for these factors. Similar deductions for local consumption of unprocessed coca leaf and opium may be possible as well through the accumulation of additional information and research.

Processing Estimates. The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin that could be refined from a crop. These variations occur because of differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures. (See the various INCSR chapters for specific information.)

Figures Change as Techniques and Data Quality Improve. Each year, research produces revisions to United States Government estimates of potential drug production. This is typical of annualized figures for most other areas of statistical tracking that must be revised year to year, whether it be the size of the U.S. wheat crop, population figures, or the unemployment rate. For the present, however, these statistics represent the state of the art. As new information becomes available and as the art improves, so will the precision of the estimates.

Status of Potential Worldwide Production

The yield figures in the INCSR are theoretical. They are estimates of potential production—the quantities that the United States Government estimates could have been produced if, and only if, all available crops were to be converted into finished drugs. These estimates do not always make allowance for losses, so actual production is probably lower than our estimates. The figures shown are mean points in a statistical range.

Potential Opium Production. In Southeast Asia, opium poppy cultivation and potential opium production decreased in 2002. The cultivated area fell to 102,590 hectares from 130,120 hectares the previous year. Potential opium gum production fell to 831 metric tons from 1,086 metric tons in 2001. This could yield approximately 83 metric tons of heroin, if all the gum were processed.

Opium poppy cultivation rose in Southwest Asia in 2002. Total hectares for Afghanistan and Pakistan increased to 31,372. Total potential opium gum production for both was 1,283 metric tons, or roughly 120 metric tons of heroin.

In the Western Hemisphere, the opium poppy growing countries have maintained active crop control efforts. In Colombia, the last United States Government estimates that there were 6,500 hectares, enough to yield an estimated 60 metric tons of opium gum, or a little more than six tons of heroin, assuming no losses. Data for 2002 were not available at the time of publication. In Mexico, there were an estimated 2,700 hectares of opium poppy in 2002, after eradication. Assuming no losses, the estimated potential yield was 47 metric tons of opium gum, or approximately 5.6 metric tons of heroin. Though no specific data was available, there is evidence of opium poppy expansion in Peru.

Coca Cultivation. Worldwide coca cultivation figures were not available at time of publication, since the annual survey for Colombia, the largest producer, was not complete. It is likely, however, the 2002 crop will be larger than the 2001 estimate of 136,200 hectares. In Bolivia, there were 24,400 hectares of coca detected. Because of weather conditions, surveys in Bolivia now cover the period June-June, rather than January-December. Peru's coca crop increased slightly to 36,600 hectares at the end of 2002. It is likely that there is coca in inaccessible areas of Brazil, but its extent is unknown. Ecuador has negligible amounts of coca.

Cocaine Field Estimates

The cocaine yield figure is offered with the same caveat as the crop harvest yield data: it is a figure representing potential production. It does not in every case allow for losses or the many other variables that one would encounter in a “real world” conversion from plant to finished drug. In fact, the amount of cocaine HCl actually making it to market is probably lower. Efficiencies vary greatly from country to country.

The United States Government estimates that in 2002, 660 metric tons of cocaine were potentially available from Colombia, 140 metric tons from Peru and 60 metric tons potentially available from Bolivia. In publishing these figures, we repeat our caveat that these are theoretical numbers, useful for examining trends. Though every year research moves us closer to more precise cocaine yield estimate for Latin America, we do not yet know for certain the actual amount available for distribution.

Consumption Data

Most of the chapters in this report contain some user or consumption data. For the most part, these are estimates provided by foreign governments or informal estimates by United States Government agencies. There is no way to vouch for their reliability. They are included because they are the only data available and give an approximation of how governments view their own drug abuse problems. They should not be considered as a source of data to develop any reliable consumption estimates.

Marijuana Production

According to USG estimates, net marijuana production in Mexico in 2002 was 7,900 metric tons of cannabis from 4,900 hectares of cultivation. In Colombia's traditional cannabis growing zones, cultivation is estimated to be about 4,000 hectares. We recognize that there may be considerable amounts of undetected cannabis cultivation in Central and East Asia, and on the African continent, though there is no evidence that any of this cannabis significantly affects the United States. As we gather more accurate information, we will report significant findings in future INCSRs.

Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation

1995–2002 (All Figures in Hectares)

	2002	2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995
Opium								
Afghanistan	30,750	1,685	64,510	51,500	41,720	39,150	37,950	38,740
India						2,050	3,100	4,750
Iran								
Pakistan	622	213	515	1,570	3,030	4,100	3,400	6,950
Total SW Asia	31,372	1,898	65,025	53,070	44,750	45,300	44,450	50,440
Burma	78,000	105,000	108,700	89,500	130,300	155,150	163,100	154,070
China								1,275
Laos	23,200	22,000	23,150	21,800	26,100	28,150	25,250	19,650
Thailand	750	820	890	835	1,350	1,650	2,170	1,750
Vietnam	1,000	2,300	2,300	2,100	3,000	6,150	3,150	
Total SE Asia	102,950	130,120	135,040	114,235	160,750	191,100	193,670	176,745
Colombia	6,500	6,500	7,500	7,500	6,100	6,600	6,300	6,540
Lebanon							90	150
Guatemala								39
Mexico	2,700	4,400	1,900	3,600	5,500	4,000	5,100	5,050
Total Other	9,200	10,900	9,400	11,100	11,600	10,600	11,490	11,779
Total Opium	143,522	142,918	209,465	178,405	217,100	247,000	249,610	238,964
Coca								
Bolivia ¹	24,400	19,900	14,600	21,800	38,000	45,800	48,100	48,600
Colombia	144,450	169,800	136,200	122,500	101,800	79,500	67,200	50,900
Peru	36,600	34,000	34,200	38,700	51,000	68,800	94,400	115,300
Ecuador								
Total Coca	205,450	223,700	185,000	183,000	190,800	194,100	209,700	214,800
Cannabis								
Mexico	3,900	3,900	3,900	3,700	4,600	4,800	6,500	6,900
Colombia	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Jamaica						317	527	305
Total Cannabis	8,900	8,900	8,900	8,700	9,600	10,117	12,027	12,205

¹ Beginning in 2001, USG surveys of Bolivian coca take place cover the period June to June.

Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation

1987–1994 (All Figures in Hectares)

	1994	1993	1992	1991	1990	1989	1988	1987
Opium								
Afghanistan	29,180	21,080	19,470	17,190	12,370	18,650	23,000	18,500
India	5,500	4,400						
Iran								
Pakistan	7,270	6,280	8,170	8,205	8,220	6,050	11,588	9,970
Total SW Asia	41,950	31,760	27,640	25,395	20,590	24,700	34,588	28,470
Burma	154,070	146,600	153,700	160,000	150,100	143,000	104,200	76,021
China	1,965							
Laos	19,650	18,520	25,610	29,625	30,580	42,130	40,400	
Thailand	2,110	2,110	2,050	3,000	3,435	4,075	2,843	2,934
Total SE Asia	177,795	167,230	181,360	192,625	184,185	189,205	147,443	78,955
Colombia				1,160				
Lebanon	20,000	20,000	20,000	3,400	3,200	4,500	na	na
Guatemala		440	na	1,145	845	1,220	710	
Mexico	50	438	730	3,765	5,450	6,600	5,001	5,160
Vietnam	5,795	3,960	3,310					
Total Other	25,845	24,838	24,040	9,470	9,495	12,320	5,711	5,160
Total Opium	245,590	223,828	233,040	227,490	214,200	226,225	187,742	112,585
Coca								
Bolivia	48,100	47,200	45,500	47,900	50,300	52,900	48,900	41,300
Colombia	45,000	39,700	37,100	37,500	40,100	42,400	34,000	25,600
Peru	108,600	108,800	129,100	120,800	121,300	120,400	110,400	108,800
Ecuador				40	120	150	240	300
Total Coca	201,700	195,700	211,700	206,240	211,820	215,850	193,540	176,000
Cannabis								
Mexico	10,550	11,220	16,420	17,915	35,050	53,900	5,003	5,250
Colombia	4,986	5,000	2,000	2,000	1,500	2,270	4,188	5,005
Jamaica	308	744	389	950	1,220	280	607	680
Total Cannabis	15,844	16,964	18,809	20,865	37,770	56,450	9,798	10,935

Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production 1995–2002 (All Figures in Metric Tons)

	2002	2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995
Opium Gum								
Afghanistan	1,278	74	3,656	2,861	2,340	2,184	2,174	1,250
India						30	47	77
Iran								
Pakistan	5	5	11	37	66	85	75	155
Total SW Asia	1,283	79	3,667	2,898	2,406	2,299	2,296	1,482
Burma	630	865	1,085	1,090	1,750	2,365	2,560	2,340
China								19
Laos	180	200	210	140	140	210	200	180
Thailand	9	6	6	6	16	25	30	25
Vietnam	10	15	15	11	20	45	25	
Total SE Asia	829	1,086	1,316	1,247	1,926	2,645	2,815	2,564
Colombia				75	61	66	63	65
Lebanon							1	1
Guatemala								
Mexico	47	71	21	43	60	46	54	53
Total Other	47	71	21	118	121	112	118	119
Total Opium	2,159	1,236	5,004	4,263	4,453	5,056	4,285	4,165
Coca Leaf								
Bolivia ¹	19,800	20,200	26,800	22,800	52,900	70,100	75,100	85,000
Colombia ²			583,000	521,400	437,600	347,000	302,900	229,300
Peru	52,700	52,600	54,400	69,200	95,600	130,200	174,700	183,600
Ecuador								
Total Coca	72,500	72,800	664,200	613,400	586,100	547,300	552,700	497,900
Cannabis								
Mexico	7,900	7,400	7,000	3,700	8,300	8,600	11,700	12,400
Colombia	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,133	4,133	4,133
Jamaica						214	356	206
Belize								
Others	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500
Total Cannabis	15,400	14,900	14,500	11,200	15,800	16,447	19,689	20,239

¹ Beginning in 2001, USG surveys of Bolivian coca take place cover the period June to June.

² Since leaf calculation is by fresh leaf weight in Colombia, in contrast to dry weight elsewhere, these boxes are blank.

Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production 1987–1994 (All Figures in Metric Tons)

	1994	1993	1992	1991	1990	1989	1988	1987
Opium Gum								
Afghanistan	950	685	640	570	415	585	750	600
India	90							
Iran								300
Pakistan	160	140	175	180	165	130	205	205
Total SW Asia	1,200	825	815	750	580	715	955	1,105
Burma	2,030	2,575	2,280	2,350	2,255	2,430	1,280	835
China	25							
Laos	85	180	230	265	275	380	255	225
Thailand	17	42	24	35	40	50	25	24
Vietnam								
Total SE Asia	2,157	2,797	2,534	2,650	2,570	2,860	1,560	1,084
Colombia								
Lebanon		4		34	32	45		
Guatemala				11	13	12	8	3
Mexico	60	49	40	41	62	66	67	50
Total Other	60	53	40	86	107	123	75	53
Total Opium	3,417	3,675	3,389	3,486	3,257	3,698	2,590	2,242
Coca Leaf								
Bolivia	89,800	84,400	80,300	78,000	77,000	78,200	79,500	79,200
Colombia	35,800	31,700	29,600	30,000	32,100	33,900	27,200	20,500
Peru	165,300	155,500	223,900	222,700	196,900	186,300	187,700	191,000
Ecuador		100	100	40	170	270	400	400
Total Coca	290,900	271,700	333,900	330,740	306,170	298,670	294,800	291,100
Cannabis								
Mexico	5,540	6,280	7,795	7,775	19,715	30,200	5,655	5,933
Colombia	4,138	4,125	1,650	1,650	1,500	2,800	7,775	5,600
Jamaica	208	502	263	641	825	190	405	460
Belize				49	60	65	120	200
Others	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	1,500
Total	13,386	14,407	13,208	13,615	25,600	36,755	17,455	13,693

Parties to the 1988 UN Convention

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
1. Afghanistan	20 December 1988	14 February 1992
2. Albania	Accession	27 June 2001
3. Algeria	20 December 1988	5 May 1995
4. Andorra	Accession	23 July 1999
5. Antigua and Barbuda	Accession	5 April 1993
6. Argentina	Accession	13 September 1993
7. Armenia	20 December 1988	28 June 1993
8. Australia	14 February 1989	16 November 1992
9. Austria	25 September 1989	11 July 1997
10. Azerbaijan	Accession	22 September 1993
11. Bahamas	20 December 1988	30 January 1989
12. Bahrain	28 September 1989	7 February 1990
13. Bangladesh	14 April 1989	11 October 1990
14. Barbados	Accession	15 October 1992
15. Belarus	27 February 1989	15 October 1990
16. Belgium	22 May 1989	25 October 1995
17. Belize	Accession	24 July 1996
18. Benin	Accession	23 May 1997
19. Bhutan	Accession	27 August 1990
20. Bolivia	20 December 1988	20 August 1990
21. Bosnia and Herzegovina	Succession	01 September 1993
22. Botswana	Accession	13 August 1996
23. Brazil	20 December 1988	17 July 1991
24. Brunei Darussalam	26 October 1989	12 November 1993
25. Bulgaria	19 May 1989	24 September 1992
26. Burkina Faso	Accession	02 June 1992
27. Burma	Ratified	11 June 1991
28. Burundi	Accession	18 February 1993
29. Cameroon	27 February 1989	28 October 1991
30. Canada	20 December 1988	05 July 1990
31. Cape Verde	Accession	08 May 1995
32. Central African Republic	Accession	15 October 2001

Policy and Program Development

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
33. Chad	Accession	09 June 1995
34. Chile	20 December 1988	13 March 1990
35. China	20 December 1988	25 October 1989
36. Colombia	20 December 1988	10 June 1994
37. Comoros	Accession	1 March 2000
38. Costa Rica	25 April 1989	8 February 1991
39. Cote d'Ivoire	20 December 1988	25 November 1991
40. Croatia	Succession	26 July 1993
41. Cuba	7 April 1989	12 June 1996
42. Cyprus	20 December 1988	25 May 1990
43. Czech Republic	Succession	30 December 1993
44. Denmark	20 December 1988	19 December 1991
45. Djibouti	Accession	22 February 2001
46. Dominica	Accession	30 June 1993
47. Dominican Republic	Accession	21 September 1993
48. Ecuador	21 June 1988	23 March 1990
49. Egypt	20 December 1988	15 March 1991
50. El Salvador	Accession	21 May 1993
51. Estonia	Accession	12 July 2000
52. Ethiopia	Accession	11 October 1994
53. European Economic Community	8 June 1989	31 December 1990
54. Fiji	Accession	25 March 1993
55. Finland	8 February 1989	15 February 1994
56. France	13 February 1989	31 December 1990
57. Gambia	Accession	23 April 1996
58. Germany	19 January 1989	30 November 1993
59. Georgia	Accession	8 January 1998
60. Ghana	20 December 1988	10 April 1990
61. Greece	23 February 1989	28 January 1992
62. Grenada	Accession	10 December 1990
63. Guatemala	20 December 1988	28 February 1991
64. Guinea	Accession	27 December 1990
65. Guyana	Accession	19 March 1993
66. Haiti	Accession	18 September 1995
67. Honduras	20 December 1988	11 December 1991

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
68. Hungary	22 August 1989	15 November 1996
69. Iceland	Accession	2 September 1997
70. India	Accession	27 March 1990
71. Indonesia	27 March 1989	23 February 1999
72. Iran	20 December 1988	7 December 1992
73. Iraq	Accession	22 July 1998
74. Ireland	14 December 1989	3 September 1996
75. Israel	20 December 1988	20 May 2002
76. Italy	20 December 1988	31 December 1990
77. Jamaica	2 October 1989	29 December 1995
78. Japan	19 December 1989	12 June 1992
79. Jordan	20 December 1988	16 April 1990
80. Kazakhstan	Accession	29 April 1997
81. Kenya	Accession	19 October 1992
82. Korea	Accession	28 December 1998
83. Kuwait	2 October 1989	3 November 2000
84. Kyrgyzstan	Accession	7 October 1994
85. Latvia	Accession	24 February 1994
86. Lebanon	Accession	11 March 1996
87. Lesotho	Accession	28 March 1995
88. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Accession	22 July 1996
89. Lithuania	Accession	8 June 1998
90. Luxembourg	26 September 1989	29 April 1992
91. Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Rep.	Accession	18 October 1993
92. Madagascar	Accession	12 March 1991
93. Malawi	Accession	12 October 1995
94. Malaysia	20 December 1988	11 May 1993
95. Maldives	5 December 1989	7 December 2000
96. Mali	Accession	31 October 1995
97. Malta	Accession	28 February 1996
98. Mauritania	Accession	1 July 1993
99. Mauritius	20 December 1988	6 March 2001
100. Mexico	16 February 1989	11 April 1990
101. Moldova	Accession	19 February 1995
102. Monaco	24 February 1989	23 April 1991

Policy and Program Development

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
103. Morocco	28 December 1988	28 October 1992
104. Mozambique	Accession	8 June 1998
105. Nepal	Accession	24 July 1991
106. Netherlands	18 January 1992	8 September 1993
107. New Zealand	18 December 1989	16 December 2002
108. Nicaragua	20 December 1988	4 May 1990
109. Niger	Accession	10 November 1992
110. Nigeria	1 March 1989	1 November 1989
111. Norway	20 December 1988	1 January 1994
112. Oman	Accession	15 March 1991
113. Pakistan	20 December 1988	25 October 1991
114. Panama	20 December 1988	13 January 1994
115. Paraguay	20 December 1988	23 August 1990
116. Peru	20 December 1988	16 January 1992
117. Philippines	20 December 1988	7 June 1996
118. Poland	6 March 1989	26 May 1994
119. Portugal	13 December 1989	3 December 1991
120. Qatar	Accession	4 May 1990
121. Romania	Accession	21 January 1993
122. Russia	19 January 1989	17 December 1990
123. Rwanda	Accession	13 May 2002
124. St. Kitts and Nevis	Accession	19 April 1995
125. St. Lucia	Accession	21 August 1995
126. St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Accession	17 May 1994
127. San Marino	Accession	10 October 2000
128. Sao Tome and Principe	Accession	20 June 1996
129. Saudi Arabia	Accession	9 January 1992
130. Senegal	20 December 1988	27 November 1989
131. Seychelles	Accession	27 February 1992
132. Sierra Leone	9 June 1989	6 June 1994
133. Singapore	Accession	23 October 1997
134. Slovakia	Succession	28 May 1993
135. Slovenia	Succession	6 July 1992
136. South Africa	Accession	14 December 1998
137. Spain	20 December 1988	13 August 1990

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
138. Sri Lanka	Accession	6 June 1991
139. Sudan	30 January 1989	19 November 1993
140. Suriname	20 December 1988	28 October 1992
141. Swaziland	Accession	3 October 95
142. Sweden	20 December 1988	22 July 1991
143. Syria	Accession	3 September 1991
144. Tajikistan	Accession	6 May 1996
145. Thailand	Accession	3 May 2002
146. Tanzania	20 December 1988	17 April 1996
147. Togo	3 August 1989	1 August 1990
148. Tonga	Accession	29 April 1996
149. Trinidad and Tobago	7 December 1989	17 February 1995
150. Tunisia	19 December 1989	20 September 1990
151. Turkey	20 December 1988	2 April 1996
152. Turkmenistan	Accession	21 February 1996
153. UAE	Accession	12 April 1990
154. Uganda	Accession	20 August 1990
155. Ukraine	16 March 1989	28 August 1991
156. United Kingdom	20 December 1988	28 June 1991
157. United States	20 December 1988	20 February 1990
158. Uruguay	19 December 1989	10 March 1995
159. Uzbekistan	Accession	14 August 1995
160. Venezuela	20 December 1988	16 July 1991
161. Vietnam	Accession	4 November 1997
162. Yemen	20 December 1988	25 March 1996
163. Yugoslavia	20 December 1988	3 January 1991
164. Zambia	9 February 1989	28 May 1993
165. Zimbabwe	Accession	30 July 1993

Signed but Pending Ratification		
1. Gabon	20 December 1989	
2. Holy See	20 December 1988	Not UN member
3. Mauritius	20 December 1988	
4. Philippines	20 December 1988	
5. Switzerland	16 November 1989	Not UN member

Policy and Program Development

Signed but Pending Ratification

6. Zaire	20 December 1988
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Other

1. Anguilla	Not UN member
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2. Aruba	Not UN member
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3. Bermuda	
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4. BVI	Not UN member
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5. Cambodia	
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6. Central African Republic	
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7. Chad	
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8. Congo	
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9. Djibouti	
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10. DPR Korea	
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11. Hong Kong	Not UN member
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12. Laos	
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13. Liberia	
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14. Liechtenstein	
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15. Marshall Islands	
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16. Micronesia, Federated States of	
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17. Mongolia	
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18. Namibia	
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19. Papua New Guinea	
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20. Samoa	
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21. Sao Tome and Principe	
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22. Taiwan	Not UN member
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23. Turks & Caicos	Not UN member
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24. Vanuatu	
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